A Subversive Strand of the Warren Court by Peller, Gary
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 4 Article 5
Fall 9-1-2002
A Subversive Strand of the Warren Court
Gary Peller
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the
Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gary Peller, A Subversive Strand of the Warren Court, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1141 (2002),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol59/iss4/5
A Subversive Strand of the Warren Court
Gary Peller"
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ...................................... 1141
II. Two-Tiered Constitutional Review in the Warren Court ..... 1143
A. The Lochner Era Constitutional Ideology ............ 1146
B. The Realist Critique ............................ 1147
C. The Embrace of Realist Premises in Constitutional
D ecisions .................................... 1149
D. The Warren Court's De Jure Individual
Rights Decisions ............................... 1150
II. The De Facto Standard as a Mediation of the Contradiction.. 1153
A. The School Segregation Remedies Cases ............. 1154
B. The De Facto Standard in Other Doctrinal Settings ..... 1157
C. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts' Rejection of
De Facto Review .............................. 1160
IV. The Virtues and Limitations of the De Facto Standard ...... 1162
V . Conclusion ...................................... 1164
I. Introduction
The choice between "de jure" and "de facto" standards of review arises
whenever a legal standard is needed to identify violations of specific constitu-
tional rights or norms in particular cases. The issue is methodological in the
sense that the question is faced regardless of the particular right or norm at
issue (although it is not really true that the choice between these methodolo-
gies would have no influence on the choice of rights or norms to apply). A de
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
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jure approach limits the imposition of constitutional norms to cases in which
the state has affirmatively acted to help create a particular state of affairs,
whether through explicit legislation or by some other affirmative mode of
exercising state power. A de facto approach focuses on a given empirical
state of social affairs and, in its strongest form, imposes constitutional norms
whenever a review of the social order discloses that constitutional ights or
norms are not extant, regardless of the source of their denial.
To help understand the distinction, think of the right of a woman to abort
her fetus recognized in Roe v. Wade. A de jure approach to identifying the
denial of her right would focus on whether the government had done anything
affirmative to block her ability to exercise her choice to abort; a de facto
approach would ask whether she in fact was able to exercise her right, regard-
less of whether the source of any burden was "private" or "governmental.'
While not articulating its decisions in this terminology, the Court's decisions
in Maher v. Roe,2 upholding a state's refusal to fund medically "unnecessary"
abortions through Medicaid while funding childbirth, and Harris v. McRae,3
upholding a federal ban on abortion funding, are vivid examples of the dejure
approach. So long as the government did
not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of
choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation.... The financial
constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range
of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of
governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her
indigency.4
Conversely, a de facto approach would have found a constitutional violation
on the basis of a woman's inability to exercise her constitutional right and
therefore would have required government funding of the abortion procedure.
Stated in terms of its possible application to identifying violations of
individual constitutional rights, the de jure/de facto distinction is related to,
though not identical with, the difference between affirmative as opposed to
negative rights. It is also implicated in the state action requirement in equal
protection, due process and individual rights contexts. A de facto approach
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
3. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
4. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980). The distinction I am discussing is not
analytically absolute. As opponents argued, one could view the regulations in both Maher and
Harris as constituting governmental action by favoring childbirth in its funding decisions. Later
decisions reviewing a complex of abortion regulations reflect the lack of analytic clarity. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-79 (1992) (stating
that law is invalid if it creates "undue burden" for woman seeking abortion).
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encompasses an affirmative rights approach, but it is not limited to individual
rights issues. Its general application would also severely curtail the applica-
tion of the state action doctrine as a limit on the application of constitutional
norms.
5
The de jure/de facto distinction is not always as polar as I treat it. In
many cases, one could interpret the de facto approach as a variant of a com-
mitment to the de jure approach. That is, a defacto standard of review could
be seen as a way to flush out state action when it is difficult to prove, or, as
in the school desegregation cases discussed below, as a way to relax causation
standards when state responsibility has already been established. Alterna-
tively, a dejure standard could constitute a particular position with respect to
the interpretation of the existing social order, a subset of de facto analysis.
Although one can mediate the polarity in particular contexts, the de jure/de
facto distinction nevertheless marks an important lens through which to see
the limits of and alternatives to dominant constitutional interpretation.
In order to understand the significance of the turn to de facto modes of
constitutional review in the various doctrinal areas in which the Warren Court
applied it, we must first comprehend the historical and doctrinal background
within which members of the Court would have conceptualized what was at
stake in constitutional interpretation. Before considering the particular
Warren Court rulings embracing a de facto standard, I turn now to a brief
description of the more general structure of constitutional review that the
Warren Court faced.
I. Two-Tiered Constitutional Review in the Warren Court
As I am using the term, the de Jure/de facto distinction refers to a meth-
odological question of how to identify and apply constitutional norms, what-
ever those norms might be. This methodological question is an overlay to the
issue of the actual content of constitutional rights and limitations; that is, the
subject matter, as opposed to the methodological, scope of constitutional law.
An important aspect of the Warren Court's partial legitimation of a de facto
mode of constitutional interpretation is that this methodological issue arose
against the backdrop of the Court's struggle to justify judicial review and the
protection of individual rights in the wake of the demise of the Lochner6 era
mode of constitutional review.
5. However, it is not clear in the Warren Court cases in which the Court debated the
distinction that it understood those more general stakes. One of the questions raised by focusing
on this methodological issue is why the Court did not consider the relevance of these similar
topics across doctrinal categories.
6. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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In terms of subject matter, the Warren Court built upon and extended an
unstable duality in constitutional doctrine. On the one hand, with the rejection
of Lochner, the Court was committed to applying a deferential rational basis
standard to the run of governmental social and economic regulation that was
understood to reflect policy judgments appropriate for legislative determina-
tion.7 On the other hand, the Warren Court revived heightened judicial review
for matters relating to personal and civil rights, taken to include the rights of
speech, voting, religion, accused criminal defendants, access to the courts, and
nondiscrimination on the basis of race or gender. The Court's decisions in the
areas of personal and civil rights are its most well known and celebrated.
The problem, however, was how to justify this duality with respect to the
degrees of scrutiny applied to these subject matter areas. If the courts owed
deference to the legislature regarding social and economic legislation, why did
they not owe the same deference in personal and civil rights cases? In order
to understand the experience of simultaneous coherence and illegitimacy that
would be associated with the de facto standard of review, it is necessary to
understand what Lochner and its fall meant for Warren Court era constitu-
tional thinkers.
By the end of the Warren Court era, a conventional rationalization of
many of the Court's decisions and its two-tiered approach, rooted in the
famous footnote four of the 1938 Carolene Products' opinion and synthesized
in the work of John Hart Ely took place.9 The basic "process theory"10 expla-
nation proceeded as follows: After the legal realist movement, mainstream
legal thinkers agreed that the realists were right and that legal issues inevitably
required policy judgments for their resolution. Legal doctrine could not
supply neutral and apolitical answers to issues of social conflict. Because all
issues required policy judgment, the judiciary lacked legitimacy to determine
those issues. Instead, only the legislature, by virtue of its democratic charac-
ter, was ultimately competent to decide issues of social policy. If the legisla-
7. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 485-91 (1955) (validating
Oklahoma laws regulating sale of eyewear); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
109-11 (1949) (deferring to local authorities as long as regulation has some relation to local
concerns); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (upholding milk law
as valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce).
8. Carolene Prods., 304 at 152 n.4.
9. See generally JoHN HART ELY, DEMOcRAcY AND DIsTRUST (1980).
10. Here I discuss process theory as a mode of constitutional interpretation. The process
theory approach to constitutional law was part of a much wider embrace of proceduralism in
post-War American law used to respond to the legal realist assault on the legitimacy of Amer-
ican legal institutions. See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH J. L.
REFoRM 561, 561-622 (1988) (analyzing Herbert Wechsler's Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law and underlying process theory approach).
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ture had in fact decided such an issue, its decision was entitled to deference.
In doctrinal terms, mere rationality review would apply. On the other hand,
because its democratic character was the basis for such general deference, the
judiciary should not defer when the legislature called its democratic character
into question by passing "legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion.""
11
This liberal rehabilitation of judicial review after the fall of Lochner
derived the subject matter scope of heightened judicial scrutiny from the very
basis for deferring to legislative action in the first place - the democratic
character of the legislature and the unelected character of the federal judiciary.
Similarly, the judiciary derived heightened scrutiny for governmental action
affecting "discrete and insular minorities"' 2 from the limits of the majoritarian
political process that mandated general deference. Because such groups could
not, as a structural matter, be expected to protect themselves through ordinary
democratic processes, deference to the legislature based on its democratic
character was not warranted for decisions affecting them. Accordingly, from
the basis for deference generally - the respective institutional competencies
of legislatures and courts - the process theory approach to constitutional law
derived the subject matter scope for heightened judicial scrutiny for personal
rights (the rights affecting the political processes, such as free speech, voting,
and related interests) and for civil rights (the rights of discrete and insular
minorities not able to protect themselves in the political process).
From this institutional competence point of view, the problem with
Lochner was that, by invalidating maximum hour legislation on the basis of
"liberty of contract,' 3 the Court had imposed its own values on its review of
economic legislation. Because the Court was unelected, and the issue of
maximum hour legislation was not capable of neutral and apolitical resolution,
its decision was institutionally illegitimate.
The premise of this conventional understanding of the mistakes of the
Lochner era was that no neutral and apolitical basis of decision was available
to resolve questions of economic regulation. By the mid-twentieth century,
the legal mainstream had embraced Justice Holmes's assertion in his Lochner
dissent that questions of economic regulation posed policy judgments about
what economic theory to pursue, and the legislature was the only institution
that could legitimately resolve such disagreements over policy. 4 Because the
11. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
12. Id.
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,61 (1905).
14. Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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institutional critique of Lochner depended on seeing issues of economic
regulation as necessarily posing policy questions, it also depended on a
rejection of the substantive theory of justice upon which the Court had based
its Lochner era decisions.
A. The Lochner Era Constitutional Ideology
From within the reigning legal ideology of the late nineteenth century,
the Lochner era judges were not overstepping their institutional bounds when
they struck down economic regulations as violative of the "liberty of con-
tract.""5 Instead, they were applying what they would have understood as the
neutral and apolitical substantive theory of liberty imbedded in the Constitu-
tion. In that view, the invalidation of maximum hour legislation in Lochner
did not involve a policy judgment at all, but rather merely the enforcement of
boundaries between public power and private liberty that the constitutional
guarantee of due process encompassed.
In order to view constitutional law as Lochner era judges might have seen
it, we must accept what we would view as a libertarian interpretation of the
Constitution, within which the Constitution demarcates appropriate spheres
of governmental power and private liberty. The reason that maximum hour
legislation was unconstitutional was not, as Holmes asserted, because the
Lochner majority disagreed with its economic policy, but rather because they
did not see it as a policy judgment at all. Instead, the relevant issues were the
protection of the liberty of individuals and the enforcement of appropriate
limits on state power. In this libertarian substantive theory of justice, individ-
uals enjoyed the private right to contract on whatever terms they saw fit;
maximum hour legislation represented a collective encroachment on this
sphere of individual liberty.
Moreover, the Lochner era judges did not simply invent the boundaries
of the private sphere that they wanted to protect against legislative encroach-
ment. They derived constitutional limits on legislative power and constitu-
tional definitions of individual liberty from the common law doctrines of
contract, property, and tort, which themselves purported to distinguish social
15. For fuller explications of the legal ideology of the Lochner period, see Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563,563-74
(1982) [hereinafter Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives]; Duncan Kennedy, Toward
an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought
in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 3, 3 (1980); Gary Peller, The Classical Theory of
Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 300, 300-09 (1988) [hereinafter Pellet, Classical Theory]; Gary
Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1193-1219 (1985), reprinted
in CRICAL LEGAL STUDIES (J. Boyle ed., 1991) [hereinafter Peller, Metaphysics].
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relations that were the result of free and voluntary choice from those that were
imposed through duress or fraud, and which were understood to set forth the
neutral framework within which individuals acted in the economic market.
Because, under common law contract doctrines, the baker in Lochner was
competent to contract and had acted of his own free will, without duress or
fraud, his agreement to work a particular number of hours was an element of
his private choice and freedom, and maximum hour legislation encroached
upon that freedom.
The common law of contracts drew a line between enforceable and
unenforceable agreements based on distinguishing between cases in which
free will was present and those in which it was absent. These doctrines
provided a ready-made delineation of private and public spheres at the consti-
tutional level. Just as a common law court would not enforce a coerced
agreement, gained through fraud or duress, the legislature was entitled to
regulate such wrongful private behavior without encroaching on individual
free will. Conversely, if a common law court would enforce an agreement as
freely entered into by competent parties, the legislature would be prohibited
from regulating such an agreement because the agreement by definition
represented the free, voluntary exercise of private liberty. In a sense, the
Lochner approach constitutionalized the common law, viewing it as a neutral
reference point for defining individual liberty at the constitutional level. The
coherence of the approach ultimately depended on whether the underlying
common law doctrines were themselves truly neutral and objective, or
whether doctrines such as fraud and duress instead embodied policy judg-
ments amounting to regulations of the market.
B. The Realist Critique
The legal realist movement consisted in large part of a full scale assault
on the underlying substantive theory of the Lochner period.16 The gist of the
16. See L. L. Fuller& WilliamR. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages,
46 YALE L.J. 52, 52-96 (1936) (attributing legal development of reliance damages in contract
law to consideration of real life problems); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470-94 (1923) (recognizing that govern-
mental inaction as well as action has consequences); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege,
Malice, and Intent 8 HARv. L. REv. 1, 1-14 (1894) (arguing that judicial decisions necessarily
often have legislative considerations and that real life judges do not apply law as they would
theories of mathematics); see also MORTON J. HOROWrrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OFAMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 35-39, 51-54 (1992) (explaining attack on
traditional contract and tort principles on lack of objectivity, despite their purporting to be
objective); Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives, supra note 15, at 563-74 (describing
different motives behind judicial construction of contract and tort law); Peller, Classical Theory,
supra note 15, at 300 (asserting that "image of a classical common law that is... neutral,
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realist critique was the demonstration that the underlying common law doc-
trines of contract, property, and tort were not themselves neutral and objec-
tive, but rather embodied policy judgments, and therefore the so-called private
law was really public. According to the realists, the market doctrines that
were assumed merely to provide neutral background rules were actually
elements of public, rather than private, law, because they reflected policy
choices about how to identify consent and which interests to protect from
violation by other private parties. For example, a commitment to respect the
private choices of individuals might require a fraud doctrine to identify when
an individual was not really making a choice, but nothing in the concept of
free choice could determine whether to define fraud narrowly, according to
caveat emptor notions, or broadly, imposing full disclosure duties. 7 The
choice between narrow and broad fraud rules had distributive consequences
with respect to whom they benefitted and whom they burdened. Although
these consequences helped establish the bargaining power of individuals with
each other, they followed from the policy decision to define fraud in a certain
way, rather than from any free choice on the part of market actors.
The same kind of analysis applied to determining which interests the law
should protect. The failure to protect a particular interest (say, freedom from
sexual harassment or gains from superior news gathering)"8 simply meant that
a privilege to injure the interest without paying compensation existed. The
protection of the interest established a right to compensation for its violation.
But nothing in the concept of property could determine whether to regulate
particular interests by establishing privileges or entitlements in particular
settings. The choice to protect was a policy judgment with obvious distribu-
tive consequences shaping the bargaining power that different individuals
bring to economic relations. 9
This realist critique of the Lochner era legal ideology was directed not
(at least in the first instance) to the proceduralist issue of whether the Court
objective, and determinative is, quite simply, analytically incoherent"); Peller, Metaphysics,
supra note 15, at 1193-1219 (arguing that formalist era judges were mistaken in their beliefs
that they could apply law without underlying ideology); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism
Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 532-42 (1988) (book review) (criticizing "neutral" principles that
liberal theorists advocate).
17. See Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives, supra note 15, at 574 (examining
hypothetical contractual promise from employee who promises not to join union).
18. See Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 229-46 (1918) (recognizing
gathered news as property interest to be protected from piracy).
19. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,417-19 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (equating legislative with common law restrictions on use of property with respect to third
party effects). See generally Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIs. L. REV. 975.
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had overstepped its institutional boundaries, but rather to debunking the
substantive libertarian theory of justice within which the Lochner era judges
could believe that their decisions were neutral and objective. The realists
demonstrated that what the Lochner era judges assumed was private - such as
contractual agreements between individuals - really bore the marks of public
power, embodied in the legal doctrines that purported to identify free contrac-
tual will, and in the doctrines establishing the baseline of entitlements and
exposures that formed the bargaining framework within which individuals
contracted. Public power constituted the "private" market.
C. The Embrace of Realist Premises in Constitutional Decisions
At the constitutional law level, those decisions holding that so-called
"private" economic relations were really of public concern because they had
public consequences - what we call today "third party effects" - reflected the
realist deconstruction of the Lochner public/private distinction most clearly.
For example, the Court's ruling inMiller v. Schoene0 mirrored the realist
point that the enforcement of "private" common law doctrines embodied public
policy judgments. The Court rejected a "takings" challenge to a state law
requiring the destruction of cedar trees endangering nearby apple orchards
because of the risks that cedar rust posed to apple trees.21 The Court asserted
that, even in the absence of legislative regulation, the application of common
law rules still would have constituted a policy choice by privileging the cedar
tree owners to injure nearby apple trees without paying compensation: "It
would have been none the less a choice if, instead of enacting the present
statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple
orchards .... " 22 As the realists had argued, the baseline common law rules did
not merely provide a neutral framework within which market actors transacted;
the legal rules necessarily benefitted some and burdened others, and no neutral
principles could justify which way such distributive consequences should run.
Similarly, in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,23 the Court
upheld a mortgage moratorium law extending the period of redemption from
foreclosure sales on the ground that private rights had meaning only in the
context of a publicly created economic structure: "[The] question is no longer
merely that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of
reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of
all depends."24 Rather than see a sharp distinction between the public and
20. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
21. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-81 (1928).
22. Id. at 279.
23. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
24. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,442 (1934).
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private spheres, the Court permitted what the Lochner era judges would have
viewed as a blatant regulation of existing contractual agreements on the ground
that private rights presuppose public power.
In Nebbia v. New York,23 the Court upheld price controls on the sale of
milk on the ground that private agreements had public consequences that were
appropriate subjects of legislative regulation. 26 In the Court's view, all "pri-
vate" businesses were "affected with a public interest 27 to the extent that
regulation of them would be beneficial. In contrast to the Lochner era's sharp
distinction between public and private realms, the Court concluded that "there
is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest."I
Several years later, the Shelley v. Kraemer 9 ruling that equal protection
norms applied to judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants seemed
to complete the constitutional embrace of realist premises by finding state
action in the simple application of common law doctrines of contract, tort, and
property.3" The implication of Shelley was that private rights could not be truly
exercised separate from state power because every exercise of such rights
ultimately depends on the state for ratification and enforcement. Furthermore,
as the Miller v. Schoene analysis demonstrated, the government could not
simply stay out of the "private" sphere because inaction embodied a policy
choice to recognize privileges on the part of individuals to harm others without
having to pay compensation. The private sphere was an empty set.
D. The Warren Court's De Jure Individual Rights Decisions
The two-tiered approach to constitutional review during the Warren Court
era partly embodied these realist analytics. Deference to legislative economic
regulation presupposed the realist critique of the Lochner era in that the basis
of such deference was the inevitably political character of economic and social
issues. However, many of the Warren Court's rulings in the areas of personal
25. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
26. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 538-39 (1934) (noting that price control is
unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or irrelevant to purposes of statute).
27. Id. at 531.
28. Id. at 536.
29. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
30. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8-23 (1948) (ruling that judicial enforcement of
restrictive covenants between private individuals is state action to which Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies). Although this general conclusion seems to follow analytically from the Court's
treatment of the issue, courts have not followed such a broad reading, which would eviscerate
virtually the entire state action doctrine. See Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer. Notes for a
Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473,473-505 (1962) (endorsing narrow reading of Shelley
in which liberty and privacy rights of people engaging in discrimination will sometimes require
judicial enforcement).
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and civil rights were in tension with its deference with respect to social and
economic matters because its rulings applying de jure standards in the areas
of personal and civil rights depended on the same libertarian image of a
private realm free from public power that it had so thoroughly discredited in
the social and economic area.
Take the Warren Court obscenity rulings, for example. In contrast to
earlier doctrine, which for the most part treated sexually explicit speech as
completely outside the realm of First Amendment protection, the Warren
Court established virtually limitless protection for sexual expression. Under
its stringent test, the Constitution prohibited the state from regulating any
sexual expression unless it was "utterly without redeeming social value."'"
The Court proceeded to issue a long series of per curiam reversals of convic-
tions for the dissemination of obscenity, finding some social value in even the
raunchiest sexual expression and curtailing substantially the ability of state
and local governments to regulate sexually explicit speech. At the height of
Warren Court protection of sexually explicit speech, the Court prohibited the
state from banning private possession of material that was obscene even under
the Court's narrow definition on the ground that such a ban would invade the
privacy interests of the reader or viewer, the "individual's right to read or
observe what he pleases."32 The basis for this strong protection of sexual
speech was the libertarian idea that individuals should be free to read and
view what they wished, without state interference. In fact, viewed this way,
state regulation appeared as an attempt to impose repressive and outmoded
sexual mores on society.
The problem, however, was that these libertarian premises of the obscen-
ity rulings made no sense in light of the realist critique of the Lochner pub-
lic/private distinction. Just as "private" economic relations had public conse-
quences, so "private" dissemination of sexually explicit material had third
party effects. In fact, the effects of such expression were apparent in the
proliferation of garish and outlandish sexual displays across the urban land-
scapes of virtually every major American city. By treating sexual expression
as if it only concerned an individual speaker and a possible recipient, the
Warren Court's approach ignored the broad third party effects manifest in the
degradation of public spaces across the country.33 Conservatives on the Court
31. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,419 (1966) (emphasis omitted). The Court
stated the Memoirs test in a plurality opinion; though the formulation was not formally adopted
by a majority, it was understood to state the relevant standard until the Burger Court narrowed
the scope of constitutionally protected sexual speech in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973).
32. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
33. Although I limit my discussion here to Warren Court obscenity rulings, the same
1151
59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1141 (2002)
were left to articulate the third party effects of sexually explicit expression on
the "interest of the public in the quality of life and total community environ-
ment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers .... '[To grant an individ-
ual the right to sexually explicit expression in public places] is to affect the
world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other privacies .... "'34
Just as the state could not simply be neutral to the "private" economic
sphere, so also it could not simply be neutral to the "private" free speech
marketplace. In the same way that the common law protection of cedar tree
owners established a legal privilege to harm apple tree owners, the Court's
protection of pornographers established a privilege to harm those with negative
reactions to various sexually explicit displays. The right to unfettered sexually
explicit public expression privileges those speakers to injure those that find
such exhibitions repugnant and inhibits those other speakers from also appear-
ing in the (now degraded) public sphere to exercise their own rights to free
speech. The exercise of a free speech right to march through Skokie, Illinois,
in Nazi regalia privileges Nazis to injure those concentration camp survivors
(and others) who suffer significant emotional distress when faced with such a
display and who may end up protecting themselves by foregoing their own
rights to public expression."5 As the realists asserted with respect to economic
relations, the state cannot be neutral to the exercise of free speech rights
because legal rules create the system of privileges and entitlements within
which private parties act, whether it be an economic marketplace or a market-
place of ideas. Even when the state does not affirmatively act, it privileges
private individuals vis-A-vis other individuals in society.
Unfortunately, many liberals and progressives during the Warren Court
period (and some beyond) mocked as parochial the attention of conservatives
to the third party effects of the exercise of private free speech rights. An odd
analysis applies to other decisions applying heightened scrutiny to the category of personal and
civil rights. The constitutional protection of libel created a privilege on the part of speakers to
injure the reputations of other individuals, yet the Court treated the situation as if the only
relevant actors were the speaker and the state, ignoring third party effects of its rulings. See
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-92 (1964) (reversing judgment of libel when no
"actual malice" existed). Similarly, keeping religion out of the public sphere privileged the
growth of secular humanism as the reigning ideology of public education. See Sch. Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,205-27 (1963) (disallowing recitation of prayers
at public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-36 (1962) (same); see also Gary Peller,
Creation, Evolution, and the New South, TIKKUN, Nov./Dec. 1987, at 72, 72-76 (arguing that
rejection of creationism is functionally state's acceptance of new evolutionist culture).
34. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1973) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Alexander Bickel, On Pornography: Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 22 PUB.
INT. 25,26 (Winter 1971)).
35. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197,1200-10 (7th Cir. 1978) (allowingNazis to march
through neighborhoods with high concentration of Holocaust survivors).
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aspect of the debate was that, in this opposition, the conservatives favoring
regulation of sexually explicit speech used the same collectivist arguments
that progressives had used a generation before in critiquing the laissez faire
economic assumptions of the Lochner era, and progressives and liberals of the
period defended a libertarian view of the relationship between public and
private spheres that had been analytically debunked decades before and that
was conceptually inconsistent with the liberal position that the Court should
defer to legislative judgment with respect to economic and social issues. Not
until the feminist critique of pornography and the anti-hate speech movements
in the 1980s and 1990s did a progressive constitutional discourse apply the
"third party effects" critique of libertarian assumptions to the category of
personal and civil rights.36
III. The De Facto Standard as a Mediation of the Contradiction
The Warren Court's two-tiered approach was analytically unstable to the
extent that the Court adopted the same libertarianism with respect to its
review of personal and political rights that its deference with respect to social
and economic issues rejected. Just as the Lochner era Court had viewed the
relationships between individuals as "private" by ignoring the constitutive role
of the state in private economic relations and the public consequences of those
market relations, many of the Warren Court's rulings with respect to personal
and civil rights applied a de jure model, which treated the state and the
individual actor as the only relevant units of analysis and ignored the public
effects of an individual speaker's or criminal's actions on other individuals in
civil society.37
36. See MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WoRDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRSTAMENDMENT 1-136 (1993) (examining and critiquing First
Amendment protections of racist speech); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights,
and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16-70 (1985) (describing harm that pornography
inflicts on women and violence that pornography represents). The same phenomenon occurred
with respect to rulings about the rights of criminal defendants. The Warren Court decisions
proceeded as if the only relevant parties were the government and the individual defendant and
suppressed the manner in which the expansion of the rights of defendants created exposures on
the part of the communities in which criminals acted. Again, not until the 1990s did progres-
sives begin to articulate the "third party effects" of the constitutional protection of the rights of
criminal defendants. See Randall Kennedy, The State, CriminalLaw, and Racial Discrimina-
lion: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255,1255-78 (1994) (arguing that underenforcement
of crimes affecting minorities is perhaps more problematic than overenforcement against
minority perpetrators).
37. I should say at this point that I agree with many of what I describe as the Warren
Court's de jure based rulings with respect to personal and civil rights; for example, I think that
many of the curbs on sexual expression struck down by the Warren Court were parochial and
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One way to solve the analytic contradiction that the Warren Court faced
with respect to its two-tiered structure of review would have been to apply the
same deference to personal and civil rights that the Court applied to social and
economic legislation. However, the problem was that the institutional pre-
mises underlying deference required some inquiry into legislative legitimacy.
As the process theorists argued: If the basis for deferring to the legislature is
its democratic character, no reason exists simply to assume that democratic
character without any inquiry whatsoever into the actual nature of the society
in which the legislature acts. If political dissension were not tolerated, for
example, a legislature in such a setting could hardly be called democratic.
Democracy, at a minimum, requires free speech rights, rights of dissent, rights
to organize and vote, and so on.
An alternative was available to resolve the contradiction in the Warren
Court's two-tiered approach. In scattered doctrinal categories, the Warren
Court adopted a de facto method for identifying the denial of constitutional
rights. The de facto approach provided a way to mediate the contradictions
in the Court's two-tiered structure of review by providing a single standard of
review regardless of the subject matter at issue. Its application in various
doctrinal contexts rejected the de jure limitation of constitutional norms to
governmental actions.
A. The School Segregation Remedies Cases
The school desegregation remedies cases decided between 1968 and 1979
most fully articulated the debate between de jure and de facto constitutional
standards at the Supreme Court level. The terminology was used to refer to
whether the equal protection ban on school segregation established in Brown
v. Board of Education" would be applied to racially identifiable schools in
which the plaintiffs had not proven that the state was responsible for the lack
of school integration (a defacto approach) or whether the right recognized by
Brown was more narrowly a right only against racial discrimination caused by
the state (a dejure approach).
The Court's 1968 decision in Green v. County School Board ofNew Kent
Count 9 represents a paradigmatic application of its de facto approach. In
Green, the Court reviewed so-called "freedom of choice" school desegregation
plans that many school systems across the South had adopted in the wake of
regressive. But, as an analytic matter, the conservatives had better arguments. They were
correct that it was intellectually indefensible to ignore the social effects of the exercise of so-
called individual rights.
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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the Brown and various desegregation orders.4 ° Under the freedom of choice
plans, the state took no formal position on pupil assignment; parents were
legally free to send their children to the public school of their choice.4 The
school system challenged in Green had legislatively mandated racial segrega-
tion of its two schools until it adopted its freedom of choice plan.42 In the
three year period during which the freedom of choice plan had been in effect,
no white child had chosen to attend the school formerly segregated for black
pupils, and about eighty-five percent of the black children remained in that
school.43
Under a de jure approach, racial segregation continuing under the free-
dom of choice school assignment policies would not have been constitution-
ally cognizable to the extent that this segregation was not traceable to affirma-
tive governmental actions. By adopting and implementing an official policy
of governmental neutrality in school assignments, the state was no longer
acting to foster school segregation - and desegregation plaintiffs in the case
were apparently not able to show that, despite its official policy, the govern-
ment was taking other racially discriminatory actions with respect to school
assignments or that continuing segregation was causally traceable to prior
governmental acts. Nevertheless, acting unanimously, the Court struck down
the freedom of choice plan and ruled that school systems that had operated de
jure segregated schools came under an "affirmative duty" to achieve inte-
grated schools, not simply a duty to cease state sponsored segregation.44
The Green result meant that, while a constitutional violation in the public
school context in the first instance still required (at least formally) a showing
of dejure action to segregate schools, once such a violation was shown, a de
facto remedial standard would apply. Apparently, as Justice Rehnquist
repeatedly charged,4 the de facto remedy was broader than the de jure right
because continuing segregation could result from parental choice, housing
patterns, and other factors that "are the product not of governmental restric-
tions," in the words of the Harris Court.46
40. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430,431 (1968).
41. Id. at 433-34.
42. Id. at 433.
43. Id. at441.
44. Id. at 437.
45. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458 (1979) (finding that
showing of defacto discrimination was sufficient because school had intentionally segregated
its schools in past); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979) (finding school
board under continuing duty to remedy dejure segregation); Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189,
265 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contending that majority opinion was too broad).
46. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,316 (1980).
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As I am presenting it, the Green decision is significant because it legiti-
mized an alternative way to apply constitutional equal protection norms
generally, one embraced without dissent on the Court. In this way, it is akin to
a ruling in the abortion funding cases47 - that the government had an obligation,
not simply to avoid putting affirmative obstacles in the way of a woman
choosing to abort but, more broadly, to ensure, through funding and subsidies,
that women were in fact able to choose the abortion procedure. By viewing
constitutional norms in the context of the racial apartheid of civil society, the
Green opinion focused on racial power as it was being exercised in fact,
regardless of whether the government was formally responsible for it or not.
True, the Green ruling need not be interpreted so broadly. Its application
of the de facto standard was limited in its formal doctrinal reach to a specific
remedial context. In addition, rather than manifesting a dramatic alternative
to a dejure standard, it might have been justified as a necessary, albeit extraor-
dinary, relaxation of the usual requirements for proof of causal consequences.
In light of the phenomenon of massive resistance to school desegregation
orders, the Green decision could be understood to rest on the belief that contin-
uing school segregation really was due to prior state action and that a de jure
approach still defined the contours of equal protection requirements. Thus,
school segregation was properly remediable within conventional understand-
ings of equal protection requirements. On this narrow reading, a de facto
standard applied to the evaluation of remedial measures only because of the
special difficulty of proof.
On the other hand, whatever narrowing interpretations might be available,
the fact is that the Court in the school desegregation context came very close
to abandoning a dejure requirement for proving an equal protection violation
altogether. While continuing to claim that it was requiring proof of de jure
segregative action to establish a constitutional violation in the first instance,
the Court dramatically relaxed the standards of proof necessary to find dejure
action by approving an expanded series of evidentiary presumptions. These
rulings enabled plaintiffs to establish a system-wide equal protection violation
by proving dejure segregative acts in only one portion of the district.48 Once
plaintiffs made that showing, they were entitled to the presumption that any
official actions with respect to policies such as pupil and teacher assignment
that failed to further integration violated the de facto standard embodied in
Green's affirmative duty to achieve integrated schools.49
47. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (discussing abortion funding cases).
48. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213 (finding entire school district guilty of dejure segrega-
tion).
49. See Penick, 443 U.S. at 467 (ruling that school board was under duty to correct past
dejure segregation); Brinkman, 443 U.S. at 541 (same).
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The debate over the choice between de jure and de facto standards for
identifying equal protection violations in the school desegregation context had
its fullest articulation at the Supreme Court level in the1973 Keyes v. School
District"0 decision, in which Justice Powell proposed that the Court no longer
require proof of dejure segregative intent or purpose, but rather order desegre-
gation "where segregated public schools exist within a school district to a
substantial degree."'" According to Justice Powell, the recognition in Green
of an affirmative duty for school systems to remedy defacto segregation once
they had been proven to have engaged in de jure segregation could not be
limited to the remedial context without imposing indefensibly different duties
in the North, which often did not have legally required school segregation, and
in the South, where legislation had typically mandated it.5 2 Justice Powell
concluded that, after Green, the de jure/de facto distinction "no longer can be
justified on a principled basis." 3
Given his center-Right jurisprudential identity, Justice Powell's opinion
inKeyes may have represented the apex ofthe possibility of applying a defacto
approach to equal protection law. Even so, this was a limited recognition at
best. Justice Powell was not proposing to apply the defacto approach gener-
ally to identify equal protection violations; his opinion discusses only the
school segregation context, and his emphasis on the different constitutional
standards that would be applied to northern and southern schools were the de
jure requirement to be applied seriously is linked to prudential considerations
rather than to a new vision of constitutional interpretation.
B. The De Facto Standard in Other Doctrinal Settings
The school desegregation cases reflected the Court's most extensive and
explicit treatment of the de jure/de facto modes of constitutional review. But,
as I have already suggested, the de jure/de facto distinction was at play in
various doctrinal contexts; using different terminology, the Warren Court
embraced defacto standards in other important rulings. Green was part of a
wider phenomenon in constitutional interpretation.
With much less controversy than the school desegregation context engen-
dered, the Warren Court adopted a defacto mode of review to identify uncon-
stitutional burdens on First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religious
beliefs. In Sherbert v. Verner,4 the Court struck down an unemployment
50. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
51. Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 224 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
52. Id. at 218-19 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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scheme that required that recipients be available for "suitable work.""5 Al-
though the regulation was facially neutral to religion, when applied to a
Seventh-Day Adventist observer of a Saturday Sabbath, the regulation ren-
dered her ineligible for benefits unless she made herself available for Saturday
work, in violation of her religious beliefs. 6 According to the Court, the burden
on her religious practice was the "same kind of burden upon the free exercise
of religion as would be a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
worship."
5
The defacto character of the Sherbert decision is evident when the ruling
is compared to the abortion funding decisions discussed above. Unlike
Sherbert, the Court in the abortion funding cases treated the burden on abortion
rights flowing from the economic inability to pay for the procedure as constitu-
tionally irrelevant because the state was not responsible for the indigency of a
poor woman choosing to abort her fetus. In contrast, in Sherbert, the Court
treated the Saturday Sabbath practitioner's economic need for unemployment
benefits as the constitutionally relevant source of the constitutional violation.
If she had been independently wealthy and therefore did not need to work or
to receive unemployment benefits, then the state's denial of benefits to her
would not have burdened her choice to observe a Saturday Sabbath. The
"pressure upon her to forego"" the observance of a Saturday Sabbath flowed
from her economic condition, the very status the Court years later would hold
constitutionally irrelevant in the abortion funding context. In Sherbert, the
Court interpreted the Constitution to require that the state consider the impact
of its social and economic regulations on individuals' ability to exercise their
constitutional rights, a position with extraordinary implications were the Court
to apply it generally.
The Warren Court pursued this kind of de facto constitutional review in
other contexts as well. In Griffin v. Illinois, 9 the Court held that the state must
provide an indigent criminal defendant appealing a conviction a free trial
transcript.' Over the dissent's argument that the state had no duty to "alleviate
the consequences of differences in economic circumstances that exist wholly
apart from any state action,"6 the plurality asserted that the impact of the
state's failure to provide a free trial transcript would be to deny meaningful
55. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,401 (1963).
56. Id. at 404.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
60. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (requiring that Illinois provide some
type of trial record on appeal if criminal defendant could not afford cost).
61. Id. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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appellate review altogether to those unable to pay for a transcript them-
selves.62 Similarly, the Court looked to the defacto impact on indigents when
it struck down the poll tax in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.63
And in perhaps the farthest-reaching application of the de facto standard, in
the final term of Chief Justice Warren's tenure, the Court in Shapiro v.
Thompson' struck down a state's residency requirement for the receipt of
welfare benefits on the ground that it constituted an unconstitutional burden
on the right of interstate travel.65 Like Sherbert, Shapiro involved a challenge
to a state's economic welfare regulations and, like Sherbert, rather than defer
to the states with respect to social and economic decisions, the Court applied
a de facto analysis to find that the impact of the waiting period for the receipt
of welfare benefits was to burden the choice of poor people who depended on
welfare benefits to travel interstate.
66
The impact analysis embodied in the de facto mode of review also
threatened the traditional state action doctrine. If the Constitution required the
government to take account of the impact of its actions on the ability of people
to exercise their rights (as this group of cases seemed to hold), the distinction
between governmental action and inaction would be insignificant. In Reitman
v. Mulkey,67 the Court came very close to obliterating the state action doctrine
as traditionally understood.s The case concerned the passage of a state
constitutional amendment that repealed state fair housing laws by prohibiting
the state from denying the "right of any person [to] decline to sell, lease, or
rent [real property] to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion,
chooses."69 Even though it recognized that the state had no obligation to pass
fair housing laws in the first instance, the Warren Court found the repeal of
such legislation constitutionally impermissible because of its "impact" in the
62. See id. at 18 (stating that requiring payment of costs would render constitutional rights
"meaningless promises to the poor"); see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58
(1963) (requiring state to provide indigent defendants appointed counsel for their first appeal
from conviction).
63. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966) (concluding
that requiring voters to pay poll tax discriminated against citizens who could not pay tax and
thus violated Equal Protection Clause).
64. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
65. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
66. See id. at 629 ("An indigent who desires to migrate... will doubtless hesitate if he
knows that he must risk making the move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare
assistance during his first year of residence, when his need may be most acute.").
67. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
68. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (declaring that statute that allowed
property renters and sellers to discriminate on basis of race violated Equal Protection Clause).
69. Id. at 371.
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racially charged "milieu in which that provision would operate."7  That
impact, the Court found, was to encourage and authorize private discrimina-
tion in housing, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause."' From the
Reitman premise that constitutional limitations apply if state "neutrality"
works in a particular factual context to encourage or embolden "private"
action, no feat of logic would be necessary to hold that the state had an
affirmative obligation to protect citizens from racial discrimination in the first
instance if its failure to act would have the de facto impact of encouraging
discrimination. In this interpretation, Reitman came analytically close to
applying the Green affirmative duty to achieve an integrated society without
the prior finding of a de jure violation that Green required.72
C. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts'Rejection of De Facto Review
Although commentators have commonly noted that the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have followed and extended many once controversial
Warren Court rulings, virtually all of the Warren Court's decisions applying
de facto standards in particular doctrinal settings have been reversed or
curtailed. In the school desegregation context, Green and its progeny have
been made largely irrelevant by the Court's willingness to find that school
70. Id. at 378-79.
71. Id. at 380-81.
72. For contemporaneous arguments that Reibnan "signaled" the functional end of the
state action doctrine for equal protection purposes, see Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreward: "State
Action," Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14,81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 99 (1967);
Kenneth C. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive
Equal Protection, 1967 S. CT. REv. 39, 55-56.
In addition to these cases, all of which were noted and controversial applications of the
de facto standard of review, the Court's heightened constitutional scrutiny of regulations of
conduct through which free speech expression occurs, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376-77 (1968) (applying heightened standard of review to law that prohibited destruction
of selective service registration certificate), constitutes a broad doctrinal area in which one can
say that defacto review at least implicitly occurs. Protection of rights to picket, leaflet, parade,
solicit door-to-door, and other conduct through which free expression occurs implicitly assumes
that rights to free speech are not meaningful if they cannot be effectively exercised. In order
to see that a state's regulation of door-to-door soliciting might impinge on free speech rights,
one must look to the defacto impact of the regulation on the exercise of free speech rights in
the same way that the Sherbert Court looked at the defacto impact of the state's availability for
work requirement, which on its face was neutral to the exercise of religious beliefs. The de
facto character of review implicit in the intermediate scrutiny accorded to regulations of conduct
with an incidental effect on free expression has, to my knowledge, only been noted in Supreme
Court opinions by Justice Scalia, who linked this doctrinal category with discredited de facto
equal protection standards and advocated applying a dejure standard of review that would end
intermediate scrutiny for regulations of conduct with an incidental effect on free speech rights.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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systems at some point discharged their duties to achieve unitary status and that
any continuing racial disproportion is not constitutionally cognizable if it
cannot be traced to dejure governmental acts.73
Sherbert has been all but overruled by the Court's decision in Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,74 which rejected
impact analysis in the context of a free exercise challenge to a state's peyote
prohibition by Native American Church members asserting, on the basis of
Sherbert, that the impact of the law on their religious practice required an
exemption." In addition, the Court has replaced the Reitman approach to the
state action doctrine with highly restrictive tests focused on formal govern-
mental action. 6
In Washington v. Davis,"' the Court gave its most extensive justification
for rejecting the de facto standard that many of the Warren Court's equal
protection rulings seemed to implement. The Court's 1971 interpretation of
Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.7 1 to require a de facto (or in that
terminology, a "disparate impact") standard for identifying discriminatory
practices in private employment suggested that a general de facto standard
might apply for equal protection purposes as well;79 Justice Powell's opinion
in Keyes, discussed above, furthered that speculation. However, in Washing-
ton, the Court definitively rejected a defacto impact standard for identifying
equal protection violations."0 The plaintiff challenged a written qualifying test
73. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995) (ordering that district court
relieve school board from judicial supervision if court found that board had discharged its
original duty to desegregate); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 499 (1992) (ruling that district
court should relinquish control of school district); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249
(1991) (ordering that district court relieve school board from judicial supervision if court found
that board had discharged its original duty to desegregate). But see United States v. Fordice,
505 U.S. 717, 726 (1992) (imposing Green affirmative duty on university system).
74. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
75. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,890 (1990); see also
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down congressional attempt to
reinstate Sherbert standard).
76. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-47
(1987) (finding that U.S. Olympic Committee is not government actor); Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-61 (1978) (rejecting government action claim when warehouseman
threatened to sell debtor's belongings as permitted by state law); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345,358-59 (1974) (finding that public utility is not government actor).
77. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
78. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
79. See Origgs V. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (finding that acts,
procedures, or tests, neutral on their face or in their intent, violate Title VII if they operate to
maintain status quo or prior discriminatory employment practices).
80. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976) (requiring discriminatory
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that the police department used, on the ground that its racially disproportion-
ate results and lack of proven relationship to the jobs for which it applied
made its use an equal protection violation."' In holding that disproportionate
impact was not a basis for a constitutional claim of discrimination, the Court
emphasized that de jure proof was required, meaning proof of a purpose or
intent to discriminate on the basis of race. 2 The Davis Court argued that a de
facto standard "would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about,
and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regula-
tory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and the
average black than to the more affluent white."'83
IV The Virtues and Limitations of the De Facto Standard
The de jure and de facto standards of constitutional review embody
distinct views about what forms of social power are relevant to constitutional
and democratic legitimacy. Most generally, the dejure approach incorporates
individualist premises, assuming that the locus of social power relevant to the
legitimacy of a liberal democracy is the state. Although, within the analytic
terms of the de jure approach, state power might be identified through more
or less formal ways, the point of a commitment to the dejure standard is that
governmental power is at issue; any power exercised in civil society that is not
governmental is constitutionally irrelevant.
The problem with the de jure standard is that it cannot legitimate as
democratic any particular social order, and thus it cannot justify general
judicial deference to governmental decisionmaking with respect to the run of
social and economic issues. The Davis Court's argument against de facto
constitutional interpretation assumes that the Court could not legitimately
review the "whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes," ' presumably because such review would make the Court's
constitutional interpretation the arbiter of such a wide scope of governmental
action. But even though its basis for deference with respect to such social and
economic legislation is the democratic character of the legislature, the de jure
approach forbids the judiciary from examining whether citizens in fact enjoy
the rights necessary for self-determination (however those rights are defined).
Just as the rules regulating the availability of welfare (in Shapiro) or unem-
purpose as element of equal protection violation).
81. Id. at 232-33.
82. See id. at 245 (ruling that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is necessary for
making out equal protection violation).
83. Id. at 248.
84. Id.
1162
A SUBVERSIVE STRAND OF THE WARREN COURT
ployment benefits (in Sherbert) have an impact on people's ability to exercise
their rights to travel or practice their religious beliefs, economic regulation in
general impacts the exercise of all rights deemed preconditions to democratic
self-rule in that it establishes and protects a particular distribution of wealth
and income. By embracing a vision of social reality in which the state is the
only force exercising collective power and in which the social universe
consists of the state and discrete private individuals, the de jure approach
recycles the debunked libertarianism of the late nineteenth century.
Particularly when applied in a formalistic way, the de jure standard
substantially limits the occasions for judicial review and therefore appears to
avoid the institutional competence problem of "judicial activism," the
unelected judiciary making policy decisions. The problem is that the de jure
standard limits judicial review according to an intellectually discredited
worldview. This return to Lochner is reflected most directly in the common
defense of de jure constitutional review that the state is not implicated in the
economic restraints that may prevent individuals from exercising particular
constitutional rights. Recall the abortion funding argument that the plaintiff's
financial constraints were "not the product of governmental restrictions...
but rather... of her indigency."' 5 The rejection of Lochner in constitutional
doctrine was premised on the opposite assumption - that the state was respon-
sible for the structure of the economy and that economic relations had public
consequences beyond the choices of particular market actors.
The virtue of the de facto standard is that it permits a wider appraisal of
the social order to determine if the social conditions for constitutional legiti-
macy actually exist. Whereas the dejure approach disclaims social responsi-
bility for individual circumstances, the defacto standard is linked to views of
collective responsibility and to the norm of social solidarity.
But the Davis Court correctly concluded that the logical consequence of
the victory of a general defacto standard of constitutional review would be to
subject virtually all legislative action to judicial scrutiny - and the result is
even more extreme than that. Under a de facto approach, no reason would
exist to wait for legislative action at all - because governmental inaction itself
might be the reason for the inability to exercise rights of free speech, or
voting, or travel. A defacto approach in its strongest form would require the
judiciary to do exactly what the two-tiered structure of constitutional review
forbids - review the constitutional legitimacy of economic and social relations
for their consistency with democratic self-rule (or whatever norms the subject
85. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980); see also (riffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
34 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("All that [the state] has done is fail to alleviate the conse-
quences in differences in economic circumstances that exist wholly apart from any state
action.").
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matter scope of constitutional review made relevant). Accordingly, were the
Court to apply widely the de facto standard, the judiciary would evaluate the
entire social field to ensure its consistency with constitutional norms.
The limitation of the defacto approach is that no neutral, principled way
to conduct the review of the social order that the standard entails exists.
There is no nonideological discourse within which to perceive and represent
social "reality." The focus on accounting for the social "facts" connects the
de facto approach to the tradition reflected in the "Brandeis brief," revealing
the limits of formalism by presenting empirical and factual information.
Whatever scientific status sociological description may have had in the early
twentieth century, by the time of the Warren Court this aspect of de facto
review was widely perceived as "political."
V Conclusion
The competition between dejure and defacto ways to identify consti-
tutionally prohibited acts represents one site of ideological conflict over the
meaning and identification of the social power that must be regulated in a
liberal democracy. The dejure approach embodies the individualist, libertar-
ian view that the formal power of the state is the only form of collective power
threatening the freedom and liberty of individual citizens. Many of the
celebrated Warren Court rulings in the areas of individual and civil rights
applied a dejure analysis, and accordingly incorporated a conservative social
theory, even as the rulings seemed to favor progressive political and cultural
positions. In addition, the embrace of a de jure standard left the Warren
Court's individual and civil rights decisions in analytic tension with its
commitment to broad deference to legislative judgments with respect to social
and economic legislation.
The de facto standard reflects a more progressive embrace of realist
premises in constitutional adjudication. The embrace of the defacto approach
in scattered Warren Court rulings points to a way to mediate the instability of
the Court's general two-tiered approach by reintroducing heightened judicial
review for social and economic legislation. The de facto approach embodies
a more collectivist view of the sites in which social power is exercised and in
which constitutional norms should therefore apply. It provides an analytic
avenue from which to escape the ultimately conservative limitation in consti-
tutional interpretation that no heightened judicial scrutiny should apply to
social and economic legislation, and from which to begin to build constitu-
tional analysis that makes democratic legitimacy turn, at least in part, on
economic justice. The near total demise of the de facto standard under the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts represents the victory of Right-wing constitu-
tional analysis.
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In my view, the rulings of the Warren Court applying a de facto
standard of review represent significant starting points for progressive critique
of dominant constitutional interpretation.86 In underdeveloped and sometimes
inconsistent ways, these cases introduce a discourse for articulating a more
collectivist, interdependent, social welfare interpretation of constitutional law.
The existence of this alternative strand of constitutional interpretation puts
into relief the ideological assumptions of reigning de jure constitutional
interpretation. And although the de facto approach cannot be applied apoliti-
cally, neither can the de jure alternative, which achieves judicial restraint only
by viewing the social world through the ideological filter of Lochner era
libertarianism.
86. Although I argue that a de facto approach opens the way for more Left-leaning
constitutional interpretation, I do not think that the defacto standard is necessarily the mark of
more progressive rulings; for example, the integrationist constitutional norms applied on a de
facto basis in the school desegregation context arguably furthered a conservative approach to
racial justice. See Oary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758,780 (describing effect
of integration on southern school desegregation).
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